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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Mary Rulla,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, William C. Pate, Judge. Affirmed.

Mary Rulla sued State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) under Business and Professions Code [FN 1] section 17200 (the Unfair Competition Law, or UCL) for providing her with insurance that failed to satisfy California’s minimum coverage requirements. On appeal, she challenges the court’s denial of her motion to certify her lawsuit as a class action.

The trial court ruled that Rulla, as the proponent of class certification, failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating a "well-defined community of interest among class members" and of showing that "class treatment [was] a superior method of handling the [] claims." Rulla contends that this ruling rested on an erroneous assumption of law and must be reversed. As discussed below, we disagree with Rulla’s contention and consequently affirm the trial court’s order denying class certification.

FACTS

Rulla’s lawsuit concerns a type of uninsured motorist insurance offered by State Farm entitled "Coverage LE." In a ruling not now before us, the trial court determined that Coverage LE limits covered losses in a manner that violates Insurance Code section 11580.2 [FN 2]. Consequently, the trial court ruled that State Farm’s sale of Coverage LE constitutes an unlawful business practice under the UCL.

In October 2002 Rulla contacted State Farm seeking information about Coverage LE. Rulla reviewed the information State Farm subsequently provided and determined that the coverage "sounded good." She then executed a waiver form entitled "California Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage Rejection/Selection From" and checked a box on the form which states, "I have the option to reject and delete all Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage....and I request deletion." After executing the waiver, Rulla signed up for coverage LE, which offers less coverage than the Uninsured Motorist coverage she waived , for a lower premium payment. She understood the limitations of the coverage. Three weeks later Rulla canceled Coverage LE. State Farm refunded her premium payment, less $2.70, which State Farm asserts represents the prorated premium for the three weeks Rulla was insured under Coverage LE.

In May 2003 Rulla filed the instant lawsuit in superior court and subsequently moved to certify the suit as a class action with the proposed class definition: "All insureds of State Farm who were issued Coverage LE in California during the period February 4, 1999, to the present and did not receive a refund of the entire premium paid for Coverage LE." After reviewing State Farm’s records Rulla identified 607 State Farm insureds who fit within her proposed class and have paid, in toto, approximately $75,000 in premiums for Coverage LE. There have also been 15 claims made by proposed class members under Coverage LE for reimbursement of covered losses.

The trial court held a hearing on the motion to certify the class. At the hearing, the court indicated that it was not inclined to grant the motion because there was little to be gained by class action treatment of Rulla’s claim and a number of potential adverse consequences of class treatment. The court emphasized that since the sole claim alleged in the case was an unfair business practice under the UCL, the case sounded in equity, and while the unlawfulness of Coverage LE was clear, the equities of State Farm’s provision of that coverage were not as clear. Consumers who signed up for Coverage LE "actually saved money by going with this cheaper coverage" as opposed to purchasing full uninsured motorist coverage. "This is not a situation where the customer did not get what they paid for. They were [paying] reduced premium[s] for reduced coverage." In the court’s view, an injunction prohibiting the sale of Coverage LE might be the sole remedy required, something the court could order whether or not the case was certified as a class action. Any further remedy, such as restitution of premiums paid for Coverage LE, the court emphasized, would require an individualized consideration of the equities of each claim, including such factors as how each member of the class suffered or benefitted from Coverage LE and what each class member would have done in lieu of purchasing Coverage LE.

The court also stated that Rulla’s claim was atypical relative to the claims of other members of the proposed class. In Rulla’s case, it could be argued that "she went out and deliberately bought a policy she thought was illegal just to bring the lawsuit, kept it for a couple weeks and then canceled it." The court feared that Rulla’s suit, if pursued as a class action, would foreclosed more meritorious claims of their members of the proposed class. Acting as a representative of the class, Rulla would likely receive little or no remedy apart from an injunction, and the other members of the class, bound by that judgment, would have "waived their right to collect what they should."

In a lengthy written order following the hearing, the trial court denied the motion for class certification, stating that for the reasons expressed at the hearing, among others, "[p]laintiff failed to carry her burden to show a well-defined community of interest among class members" or the show that "class treatment [was] a superior method of handling the [] claims."

DISCUSSION

I

We begin by summarizing the applicable legal principles and standards of review. The burden is on the proponent of class certification "to establish the requisite community of interest." (Lockheed Marin Corp. v Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal. 4^th 1096, 1104.) "The community of interest requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class." (Richmond v Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal. 3d 462, 470 (Richmond); Code Civ. Proc., 382.)

The proponent of class certification must also "show substantial benefit will result both to the litigants and to the court." (Blue Chip Stamps v Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal, 3d. 381, 385 (Blue Chip Stamps); Newell v State Farm General Ins. Co. (2004) 118 Cal. App. 4^th 1094, 1101 (Newell) [" A class action also must be the superior means of resolving the litigation, for both the parties and the court"].) This requirement recognizes that while class action litigation can perform an important function in remedying injustice, class actions also "may create injustice: because they can "deprive an absent class member of the opportunity to independently press his claim, preclude a defendant from defending each individual claim to its fullest, and even deprive a litigant of a constitutional right." (City of San Jose v Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 458.) Consequently, the trial court must "carefully weigh respective benefits accrue both to litigants and the courts." (Id. at p. 459.) "The class action is a product of the court of equity-codified in section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It rests on considerations of necessity and convenience, adopted to prevent a failure of justice." (Id. at p. 458.)

Our review of the trial court’s ruling on a class certification motion is highly deferential. Trial courts are "afforded great discretion in granting or denying certification" because they are "ideally situated to evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group action." (Linder v Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal. 4^th 429, 435-436 (Linder).) Our task, therefore, on appeal "is not to determine in the first instance whether the requested class is appropriate but rather whether the trial court has abused its discretion in denying certification.: (Osborne v Sunaru of America, Inc. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 646,654 (Osborne).) "[W]e will affirm the trial court so long as [its class certification] ruling is supported by substantial evidence and is not based on improper criteria or erroneous legal assumptions." (Wilens v Waterhouse Group, Inc. (2003) 120 Cal.App.4th 746,752 (Wilens); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 758, 764-765 (Dean Witter) ["So long as [the trial] court applies proper criteria and its action is founded on a rational basis, its ruling must be upheld"] ; Linder, at pp. 435-436 ["‘Any valid pertinent reason stated will be sufficient to uphold the order’"].)

II

The trial court’s denial of Rulla’s class certification motion implicated three prongs of the community of interest requirement: (i) whether individual questions predominated over common ones; (ii) the typicality of Rulla’s claim; and (iii) the adequacy of Rulla’s representation of the class. The trial court also analyzed Rulla’s claim in the context of the overarching requirement that class action treatment be a superior method for handling the litigation. In its analysis of each of these requirements, the trial court relied on a single legal assumption–that it’s discretion in fashioning any appropriate remedial measures was not limited solely to ordering a full refund of premiums paid, but rather the appropriate remedial measures was not limited solely to ordering a full refund of premiums paid, but rather the appropriate remedy would depend on "the equities on both sides of [the] dispute.’" Rulla challenges this assumption, which she contends is erroneous. By framing her argument on appeal as a challenge to a legal assumption made by the trial court, Rulla, on this narrow issue, avoids the abuse of discretion standard that would otherwise apply to our analysis. (See Wilens, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 752.) [FN 3]

Rulla summarizes her contention as follows: "[T]he superior court made a fundamental legal error that was the basis of its denial of class certification. Both at the hearing, and again in its order, the court rejected Rulla’s contention that restitution (of premiums) was required as a matter of law....." Instead, according to Rulla,, "[t]he court erroneously believed that the ‘equities on both sides of [this] dispute’ could be evaluated in fashioning a remedy [, and] that Rulla’s action ‘does not necessarily require the refund of all premiums collected relative to Coverage LE."

Rulla argues that contrary to the trial court’s reasoning, the court had no discretion in fashioning a restitutionary remedy, regardless of its view of the equities of the parties. She claims that once the trial court determined that Coverage LE was unlawful, it had only one option- to order State Farm to refund all premiums received for Coverage LE, including the $2.70 withheld from Rulla. Any lesser remedy, Rulla argues, would constitute an unlawful award of "compensation" to State Farm, rewarding a wrongdoer for illegal action.

III

Contrary to Rulla’s contention, the trial court’s legal assumption- that it was not limited in its determination of the appropriate remedy to awarding a full refund of premiums- was not erroneous. The UCL proved broad discretion to the trial court in determining what, if any, restitution award is appropriate. Rulla’s argument that the trial court was precluded from fully exercising that discretion in this case is unavailing.

Rulla’s contention that the trial court’s discretion was limited to one remedy "as a matter of law" is chiefly undermined by the UCL stature itself. Under the applicable remedial provision of the UCL, when a violation of the statute is shown, the "court may make such orders or judgments...as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property...acquired by means of such unfair competition."(( 17203, italics added.) [FN 4] As our Supreme Court has stated, this provision "does not mandate restitutionary or injunctive relief when an unfair business practice has been shown." (Cortez v Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal. 4^th 163, 180 (Cortez).) Instead, it constitutes "a grant of broad equitable power" enabling the trial court to order such relief if, and to the extent, determined necessary. (Ibid.) This equitable power cannot properly [be] exercise[d] without consideration of the equities on both sides of a dispute," but rather "consideration of the equities between the parties is necessary to ensure an equitable result." (Id. at pp. 180, 181.)

The trial court’s broad discretion recognized in Cortez to award, inter alia, no restitution at all cannot be squared with Rulla’s argument that in this case "restitution (of premiums) was required as a matter of law." (Italics added.) Similarly, the Cortez court’s holding that discretion under the UCL "cannot properly [be] exercise[d] without consideration of the equities on both sides of a dispute" (Cortez, supra, 23 Cal. 4^th at p. 180) refutes Rulla’s contention that because "restitution is a one-way street," the trial court was required to consider solely the equities of the defendant’s class-wide conduct, without reference to the facts of individual class members’ claims. [FN 5]

The trial court explicitly relied on this language from Cortez in its order denying Rulla’s motion, quoting from the opinion at length. Rulla fails on appeal to distinguish or even mention the Cortez case, relying instead on a handful of inapposite UCL cases decided by the California Courts of Appeal. These cases are easily distinguished as they simply uphold the trial court’s discretion to order restitution analogous to a refund of all premiums where the equities of the case merit such an award-an uncontroversial proposition that we presume neither the trial court nor State Farm would dispute.

The principle cases upon which Rulla relies are People ex rel, Kennedy v. Beaumont Inv., Ltd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 102, 133-134 (Beaumont) and People ex rel. Bill Lockyer v. Fremont Life Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 532 (Fremont). In Beaumont, the trial court found that the defendants’ practice of charging rent in excess of that permitted by a rent control ordinance was unlawful under the UCL and awarded restitution of the excess rent collected. (Beaumont, at p. 112.) On appeal, the Beaumont court rejected the defendants’ argument that the trial court abused its discretion in fashioning an award of restitution that placed the plaintiffs in a better position than they would have achieved absent the illegal rental agreement (i.e., under prevailing market conditions). (Beaumont, at pp. 133-134.) The court explained that while the defendants’ argument might prevail in a case sounding in contract, it was unpersuasive in the context of the trial court’s "very broad" discretion to fashion statutory (i.e., non-contract) remedies under the UCL. (Ibid.) Similarly, in Fremont, the Court of Appeal held that a disputed restitution order refunding deceptive insurance premiums was not an abuse of discretion even though it had the potential to allow plaintiffs who were not deceived, the receive a refund. The Fremont court noted that under the UCL, "restitution may be ordered without individualized proof of harm." (Id., at p. 532, italics added.) [FN 6]

Thus, both Beaumont and Fremont support, at most, an argument that the trial court’s "very broad" discretion under the UCL includes the discretion to order restitution along the lines of Rulla’s proposal- a full refund of premiums. (Beaumont, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 134-135.) [FN 7]. That is not, however, the contention now before us. Rather, Rulla’s appeal depends on the proposition that despite the trial court’s broad discretion to order equitable remedies under the UCL, in this case it was required as a matter of law to award a specific remedy: a class-wide refund of all premiums paid. Neither Beaumont nor Fremont stand for this proposition and, as we have discussed above, Cortez- a case by which we are bound-explicitly refutes it.

Rulla’s further attempts to support her contention that the trial court’s legal assumption regarding the appropriate remedy was erroneous with an asserted "rule" of equity: that a knowing party to an illegal contract (i.e., State Farm) may not receive any benefit from that contract. However, the case law relied on by Rulla for this rule demonstrates that it is not a rule at all but rather a general precept, subject to the same equitable considerations that motivated the trial court’s denial of class certification here. [FN 8] As the primary case relied on by Rulla explains" "[T]he effect of illegality on the enforceability of an agreement depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case including the kind and degree of illegality involved, the public policy or policies to be served, whether those public policies will best be served by enforcing the agreement or denying enforcement and the relative culpability and equities of the parties." (Homestead Supplies, Inc. v. Executive Life Ins. Co. (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 978,989, italics added, citing Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d. 141, 150-151.) [FN 9] Thus, contrary to Rulla’s argument, the trial court was permitted to consider equitable factors in its determination of the appropriate remedy even under the non-UCL case law upon which Rulla relies.

The trial court’s assumption that it had discretion to fashion a remedy that did not include a full refund of premiums is further strengthened by the unique nature of the UCL violation found in this case. As the trial court noted, the proposed class members were not deceived; they received the insurance they paid for and actually saved money by purchasing Coverage LE as opposed to the statutorily required coverage. [FN 10] Consequently, members of the proposed class would presumably be made whole, and also receive an additional benefit of the premium savings, if the court simply ordered that the statutorily mandated uninsured motorist coverage be read (both prospectively and, if necessary, retroactively) into State Farm’s Coverage LE policies. In fact, this is a remedy that Rulla, citing Daun, supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 606,610, argues is also mandated by law. (Cf. 17203 ["The court may make such orders or judgments...as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this chapter"].) Rulla fails to explain why, assuming the availability of this injunctive relief, a further reward of restitution of premiums- which would result in the class members not only receiving the statutorily required coverage at a discount, but free of charge– is mandated either by principles of equity or, as a matter of law, under the UCL. (Cf. Collins v. Safeway Stores, Inc (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 62,75 [finding no purpose served by requiring company that sold contaminated eggs to disgorge money received for the eggs where "all but a relatively small portion of the ‘ill-gotten gain’ was in fact consumed in the production, sorting, packaging, shipping and marketing of the contaminated [eggs]"].)

In sum, Rulla cites no authority, and we are aware of none which suggests that once the proposed class was certified, the trial court would be obligated as a matter of law to order a full refined of all premiums paid for Coverage LE regardless of the equities. In fact, the relevant authority is directly to the contrary. Thus, we conclude that the legal assumption upon which the trial court based its ruling, and Rulla now bases her challenge, was not erroneous.

IV

Having rejected Rulla’s contention that the trial court’s denial of the class certification motion was based on an "erroneous legal assumption []" (Wilens, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 752), our remaining task "is not to determine in the first instance whether the requested class is appropriate but rather whether the trial court has abused its discretion in denying certification." (Osborn, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 654; Richmond, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 470 ["trial courts have been given great discretion with regard to class certification"].) Under this standard, "‘[t]he burden is on the party complaining to establish an abuse of discretion’" and a reviewing court "should not disturb the exercise of a trial court’s discretion unless it appears that there has been a miscarriage of justice." (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.)

As discussed below, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying class certification on at least two cited grounds, namely, (i) the equities of Rulla’s claim rendered her an atypical representative of the proposed class, and (ii) a class action was not a superior method of handling the claims. (Linder, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 435-436 [in review of class action certification, "‘[a]ny valid pertinent reason stated [by the trial court] will be sufficient to uphold the order’"].) We examine each of these grounds in turn.

First, we can see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Rulla failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that she was a typical member of the class given the unique facts of her claim against State Farm. The facts before the trial court established that Rulla sought out the illegal Coverage LE policy, purchased and then immediately canceled it without ever being in an accident and was refunded all but $2.70 of the premium paid. As the trial court noted, these facts placed Rulla at the extreme, essentially de minimus, margin of the proposed class and suggested that she was not "truly representative of the absent, unnamed class members." (Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co. (1993) 18 CalApp.4th 644, 665 (Caro) [no abuse of discretion in denying certification of class action where representative plaintiff’s claim to relief in section 17200 claim was weak relative to other potential members of class] Reese v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1236 (Reese) [no abuse of discretion in refusing to certify class where plaintiff had "deliberately gone to Wal-Mart, rather than his normal automotive service, on the day in question for purposes of being denied the [challenged] discount"].) This was especially significant, in the trial court’s view, given that the lawsuit sounded in equity, and the equities of Rulla’s claim suggested that no equitable remedy at all, beyond an injunction prohibiting the sale of Coverage LE, was required.

The trial court’s analysis was not, as Rulla suggests, that Rulla’s claim was atypical simply because her $2.70 damages were less than those of other members of the class. (See Caro, supra, 18 Cal.App.4th at p. 665 [generally, a "difference in computing damages is not sufficient to deny class certification"].) Rather, the trial court considered, as is proper, differences in "the actual existence of damages or in the manner of incurring damages" among those factors that made Rulla’s claim atypical. (Ibid. [trial court did not abuse discretion in finding absence of typicality based on plaintiff’s damages because while generally a "difference in computing damages is not sufficient to deny class certification, differences in the actual existence of damages or in the manner of incurring damages are appropriate considerations," citing cases], Wilens, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 756 [rejecting challenge to denial of certification because trial court considered damages where common issue of unconscionability of contract was common to all class members; "the individual issues here go beyond mere calculation; they involve each class member’s entitlement to damages"].)

Thus, with respect to the typicality prong of the community of interest requirement, the trial court "applie[d] proper criteria and its action is founded on a rational basis"; consequently, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s ultimate determination that Rulla failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that she was a typical member of the class. (Dean Witter, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 765-765 ["‘So long as [the trial] court applies proper criteria and its action is founded on a rational basis, its ruling must be upheld’"].)

Second, we also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rulla’s motion on the related ground that a class action spearheaded by Rulla was not "the superior means of resolving the litigation, for both the parties and the court." (Newell, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1101; Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 435 [trial courts are "afforded great discretion in granting or denying certification" because they are "ideally situated to evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group action"].) As the court noted, even without class action certification it could enjoin the illegal conduct – and this was, in the court’s view, potentially the sole remedy required on the facts of the case. ( Dean Witter, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 773 [in light of unique remedies available under UCL no abuse of discretion for trial court to refuse to certify class where "there is no basis for a finding that the class certification presents a superior method for adjudicating the unfair competition claim"]; Reese, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 1239 [in light of broad remedies available under UCL, trial court did not abuse discretion in concluding that "the benefits of class treatment were not demonstrated"].) Once the trial court determined that it was not inclined to grant class-wide restitution of premiums which, as we have stated, it was not obligated to order, it was unclear why a class action would provide any benefit to the court or the litigants. Rather, the primary consequence of class action treatment was the potential harm done to class members with more compelling claims than Rulla’s– class members who would otherwise "have a strong interest in controlling their own case." (Newell, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1104; Blue Chip Stamps, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 386 ["when the individual’s interests are no longer served by group action, the principal —if not the sole ----beneficiary then becomes the class action attorney. To allow this is ‘to sacrifice the goal for the going, ‘burdening if not abusing our crowded courts with action lacking proper purpose"].)[FN 11] As the proponent of class action certification, it was Rulla’s burden to "show substantial benefit will result both to the litigants and to the court." (Blue Chip Stamps, at p. 385) We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Rulla failed to meet this burden.

In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not rely on an erroneous assumption of law in its order denying class certification and acted within its discretion in denying certification on the basis of at least two of the grounds cited by that court. As "‘[a]ny valid pertinent reason stated will be sufficient to uphold the order, ‘" we must, therefore, affirm. (Linder, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 436.)

DISPOSITION

Affirmed.

1. All statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code unless other wise specified.

2. California law requires motor vehicle insurance policies to include a statutorily-mandated minimum coverage for damages caused by uninsured or underinsured motorists. (Daun v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 599, 606 (Daun), citing Ins. Code, 11580.2.) The insurer is entitled to charge a fee for this coverage; an insured may execute a waiver explicitly waiving the coverage and avoiding the fee. (Ibid.)

3. Rulla’s determined effort to establish an error of law in the trial court’s ruling, and in so doing avoid the abuse of discretion standard that would otherwise apply, places the issues she raises in an unusual procedural posture. Rulla’s appeal essentially asks this court to determine the appropriate class-wide remedy for State Farm’s asserted UCL voilation at the class certification stage and as a matter of law. As we note in the analysis that follows, such a request is not only procedurally premature but flatly contrary to the equitable nature of UCL remedies.

4. Section 17203 reads as relevant: "Any person who engages....in unfair competition may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court may make such orders or judgments, including the appointment of a receiver, as may be necessary to prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this chapter, or as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.

5. Rulla asserts: "The [trial] court erroneously believed that ‘the equities on both sides of [this] dispute could be evaluated in fashioning a remedy."

6. The other Court of Appeal decision relied on by Rulla similarly offers no support for the sweeping legal proposition she asserts. (See Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 1282,1289,1292 (Massachusetts Mutual) [no abuse of discretion where the trial court certified a class action against an insurer that failed to disclose material information to insureds, despite argument that each asserted claim of deception would need to be litigated individually; UCL does not require an individualized showing of deception].)

7. The language in Beaumont that Rulla highlights, which states that "the trial [is] not required to place defendants in the status quo ante" when awarding UCL restitution, is inapposite. (Beaumont, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 135.) The Beaumont decision simply states that under the UCL, the trial court’s "statutory" discretion in ordering restitution is broader than that permitted under "contract" law, and includes such considerations as penalizing the defendant for unlawful conduct and deterring future violations. (Ibid.) The Beaumont decision nowhere suggests that the UCL’s statutory broadening of the trial court’s discretion somehow mandates any particular remedy as a matter of law, which is what Rulla contends here. In fact, as noted above, any such contention is explicitly refuted by Cortez, and the statutory text of the UCL itself.

8. The cases cited by Rulla for this principle are also easily distinguished because they do not concern the "unique scope" of the UCL. (Massachusetts Mutual, supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291 [nothing that reference to non-section 17200 cases in this context was unpersuasive because "[n]one of the cases...cited involve the UCL and its unique scope"].)

9. Similarly, Rulla’s reliance on Palm Springs Paint Co. v. Arenas (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 682,689, is unavailing. In that case, the plaintiff, a knowing party to an illegal contract, sued to recover on the contract under a theory of unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeal held that recovery was not available because "[t]he facts of this case do not bring [plaintiff] within any of the exceptions noted in Palm Springs would apply to the facts here, the case is distinguishable because, unlike the plaintiff in Palm Springs, State Farm is not seeking to recover on an illegal contract but merely contends that the trial court has discretion under the UCL to award something other than full restitution of premiums.

10. As Rulla herself states, "The class members all purchased the exact same type of limited coverage to save money on their premiums..."

11. We reject State Farm’s argument that the existing record demonstrates that Rulla lacks standing to bring a claim under the UCL. This is not a case where Rulla’s claim is asserted solely on behalf of others. Rulla herself purchased the allegedly unlawful insurance, and State Farm retains a portion of Rulla’s payment–$2.70. (See Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1262 [determining that Proposition 64 applies retroactively, but standing sufficiently established by claim of property damage].)

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